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Abstract
A secret sharing scheme is a method to store information securely and reliably. Particularly, in a
threshold secret sharing scheme, a secret is encoded into n shares, such that any set of at least t1 shares
suffice to decode the secret, and any set of at most t2 < t1 shares reveal no information about the secret.
Assuming that each party holds a share and a user wishes to decode the secret by receiving information
from a set of parties; the question we study is how to minimize the amount of communication between the
user and the parties. We show that the necessary amount of communication, termed “decoding bandwidth”,
decreases as the number of parties that participate in decoding increases. We prove a tight lower bound on
the decoding bandwidth, and construct secret sharing schemes achieving the bound. Particularly, we design
a scheme that achieves the optimal decoding bandwidth when d parties participate in decoding, universally
for all t1 ≤ d ≤ n. The scheme is based on Shamir’s secret sharing scheme and preserves its simplicity and
efficiency. In addition, we consider secure distributed storage where the proposed communication efficient
secret sharing schemes further improve disk access complexity during decoding.
Index Terms
Security, secret sharing, communication bandwidth, distributed storage, Reed-Solomon codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the scenario that n parties wish to store a secret securely and reliably. To this end, a dealer
distributes the secret into n shares, i.e., one share for each party, such that 1) (reliability) a collection A
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2of “authorized” subsets of the parties can decode the secret, and 2) (secrecy) a collection B of “blocked”
subsets of the parties cannot collude to deduce any information about the secret. A scheme to distribute the
secret into shares with respect to access structure (A,B) is called a secret sharing scheme, initially studied
in the seminal works by Shamir [14] and Blakley [3]. A secret sharing scheme is perfect if a subset of
parties is either authorized or blocked, i.e., A∪B = 2{1,...,n}. The scheme is referred to as a ramp scheme
if it is not prefect. Besides its application in distributed storage of secret data, secret sharing became a
fundamental cryptographic primitive and is used as a building block in numerous secure protocols [1].
We focus on secret sharing schemes for the threshold access structure, i.e., A contains all subsets of
{1, ..., n} of size at least n− r, and B contains all subsets of {1, ..., n} of size at most z. In other words,
the secret can be decoded in the absence of any r parties, and any z parties cannot collude to deduce
any information about the secret. The threshold access structure is particularly important in practice,
because for this case, space and computationally efficient secret sharing schemes are known. Specifically,
Shamir [14] constructs an elegant and efficient perfect threshold scheme using the idea of polynomial
interpolation. Shamir’s scheme is later shown to be closely related to Reed-Solomon codes [12] and is
generalized to ramp schemes in [4], [18], which have significantly better space efficiency, i.e., rate, than
the original perfect scheme. Shamir’s scheme and the generalized ramp schemes achieve optimal usage of
storage space, in the sense that fixing the size of the shares, the schemes store a secret of maximum size.
The schemes are computationally efficient as decoding the secret is equivalent to polynomial interpolation.
An example of Shamir’s ramp scheme is shown in Figure 1. Other threshold secret sharing schemes and
generalizations of Shamir’s scheme may be found in [9], [19], [11], [10]. The reader is also referred to
[1] for an up-to-date survey on secret sharing.
Party 1 Party 2 Party 3 Party 4 Party 5 Party 6 Party 7
f(1) = f(2) = f(3) = f(4) = f(5) = f(6) = f(7) =
m1 +m2 + k m1 + 2m2 + 4k m1 + 3m2 + 9k m1 + 4m2 + 5k m1 + 5m2 + 3k m1 + 6m2 + 3k m1 + 7m2 + 5k
Fig. 1: Shamir’s scheme (ramp version) for n = 7, r = 4, z = 1, with symbols over F11. The scheme
stores a secret of two symbols, denoted by m1,m2. Let k be a uniformly and independently distributed
random variable. f(x) is the polynomial m1+m2x+ kx2. Note that the share stored by any single party
is independent of the secret because it is padded by k, and that the secret can be decoded from the shares
stored by any three parties by polynomial interpolation.
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3In addition to space and computational efficiency, this paper studies the communication efficiency for
secret sharing schemes. Consider the scenario that a user wishes to decode the secret by downloading
information from the parties that are available. Referring to the amount of information downloaded by
the user as the decoding bandwidth, a natural question is to address the minimum decoding bandwidth
that allows decoding. It is of practical interest to design secret sharing schemes that achieve a small
decoding bandwidth, or in other words, that require communicating only a small amount of information
during decoding. In such a case, decoding will be completed in a timely manner and the communication
resource will be more efficiently utilized.
In many existing secret sharing schemes, e.g., [14], [12], [9], [4], [18], [19], [11], [10], a common
practice in decoding is that the user will communicate with a minimum set of parties, i.e., exactly n− r
parties (even if d > n − r parties are available) and download the whole share stored by these parties.
Wang and Wong [17] show that this paradigm is not optimal in terms of communication and that the
decoding bandwidth can be reduced if the user downloads only part of the share from each of the d > n−r
available parties. Specifically, given d, for any perfect threshold secret sharing scheme, [17] derive a lower
bound on the decoding bandwidth when exactly d parties participate in decoding, and design a perfect
scheme that achieves the lower bound. The field size of the scheme is slightly improved in [20]. However,
two interesting and important problems remain open: 1) the schemes in [17], [20] achieve the lower
bound on decoding bandwidth when the number of available parties d equals a single specific value, and
do not achieve the bound if d takes other values. This raises the question whether the lower bound is
uniformly tight, or in other words, it is possible to design a single scheme that achieves the lower bound
universally for all d in the range of [n − r, n]. 2) The results in [17], [20] target the case of prefect
secret sharing schemes. It is well known that for any perfect scheme, the size of each share is as large
as the size of the secret [15], [7], i.e., the rate of a perfect scheme is at most 1/n. Any scheme with a
higher rate is necessarily a (non-perfect) ramp scheme, which raises the question of how to generalize the
results and ideas to non-perfect schemes. Both problems are of practical importance as the first problem
addresses the flexibility of a scheme in terms of decoding, and the second problem addresses the high-rate
case which is a typical requirement in many practical applications. In this paper we settle both problems
and construct (perfect and ramp) schemes of flexible rate that achieve the optimal decoding bandwidth
universally. Similar to Shamir’s scheme, our schemes are computationally efficient and have optimal space
efficiency.
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4A. Motivating Example
Party 1 Party 2 Party 3 Party 4 Party 5 Party 6 Party 7
m1 +m2 + k1 m1 + 2m2 + 4k1 m1 + 3m2 + 9k1 m1 + 4m2 + 5k1 m1 + 5m2 + 3k1 m1 + 6m2 + 3k1 m1 + 7m2 + 5k1
m3 +m4 + k2 m3 + 2m4 + 4k2 m3 + 3m4 + 9k2 m3 + 4m4 + 5k2 m3 + 5m4 + 3k2 m3 + 6m4 + 3k2 m3 + 7m4 + 5k2
m5 +m6 + k3 m5 + 2m6 + 4k3 m5 + 3m6 + 9k3 m5 + 4m6 + 5k3 m5 + 5m6 + 3k3 m5 + 6m6 + 3k3 m5 + 7m6 + 5k3
(a) Shamir’s Scheme
Party 1 · · · Party 7
f(1) = k1 +m1 +m2 +m3 +m4 +m5 +m6 · · · f(7) = k1 + 7m1 + 5m2 + 2m3 + 3m4 + 10m5 + 6m6
g(1) = k2 +m4 +m5 +m6 · · · g(7) = k2 + 7m4 + 5m5 + 2m6
h(1) = k3 +m3 +m6 · · · h(7) = k3 + 7m3 + 5m6
(b) Proposed Scheme
Fig. 2: Two secret sharing schemes for n = 7, r = 4 and z = 1 over F11. Both schemes store a secret of six symbols
(m1, ..., m6). In both schemes, k1, k2, k3 are i.i.d. uniformly distributed random variables. Scheme (a) is Shamir’s
scheme (see Figure 1) repeated three times. In scheme (b), f(x) = k1+m1x+m2x2+m3x3+m4x4+m5x5+m6x6,
g(x) = k2 +m4x+m5x
2 +m6x
3, h(x) = k3 +m3x+m6x2, and party i stores evaluations f(i), g(i) and h(i).
Note that in (b), if all 7 parties are available, then the secret can be decoded by downloading only one symbol f(i)
from each party i, and then interpolating f(x). If any 4 parties are available, then the secret can be decoded in the
following way. Download two symbols f(i), g(i) from each available party i and first interpolate g(x), implying
that all coefficients of f(x) of degree larger than 3 are decoded. The remaining unknown part of f(x) is a degree-
3 polynomial and so we have enough evaluations of f(x) to interpolate it, hence completely decoding the secret.
Similarly, if any 3 parties are available, then the secret can be decoded in the following way. Download all three
symbols f(i), g(i), h(i) from each available node i and interpolate h(x), which decodes the degree-3 coefficients
of f(x) and g(x). Hence the remaining unknown part of g(x) is a degree-2 polynomial and can be interpolated,
which decodes the coefficients of f(x) of degrees 4, 5, 6. Hence the remaining unknown part of f(x) is a degree-2
polynomial and can be interpolated, decoding the complete secret. This shows that the scheme meets the reliability
requirement. In fact, for d = 3, 4, 7, scheme (b) achieves the optimal decoding bandwidth when d parties participate
in decoding. The secrecy of the scheme derives from the secrecy of Shamir’s scheme, as each polynomials f(x),
g(x) and h(x) individually is an instance of Shamir’s scheme, and we show that combining them still meets the
secrecy requirement. The construction is discussed in detail in Section IV.
Consider Shamir’s ramp scheme in the example of Figure 1, that stores 2 symbols securely and reliably
for the setting n = 7, r = 4 and z = 1. In order to decode the secret, a user needs to download 3 symbols
from any 3 parties, and therefore the decoding bandwidth is 3 symbols. Now suppose the same scheme
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5is repeated 3 times in order to store a secret of 6 symbols, as shown in Figure 2a. Then to decode the
secret, the decoding bandwidth is 9 symbols.
We propose a new scheme in Figure 2b that also stores a secret of 6 symbols for the same setting,
using the same amount of storage space, and over the same field size. In this scheme, if any 3 parties are
available, then similar to Shamir’s scheme, the secret can be decoded from the 9 symbols stored by the
three parties. However, if any 4 parties are available, then the secret can be decoded by downloading 2
symbols from each available party. Therefore, the decoding bandwidth is improved to 8 symbols. If all 7
parties are available, then the secret can be decoded by downloading only 1 symbol from each party and
so the decoding bandwidth is further reduced to 7 symbols.
We use the examples in Figure 2 to highlight several ideas to reduce the decoding bandwidth. Firstly,
the amount of communication depends on the number of available parties. In fact the necessary amount of
communication decreases strictly as the number of available parties increases. Secondly, it is important to
distribute multiple subshares (symbols) to a party (essentially using the ideas of array codes [6], [5]). In
contrast, Shamir’s scheme only distributes one symbol to each party except for trivial repetitions. Thirdly,
during decoding it is not always necessary to download the complete share stored by a party. In general,
a party can preprocess its share and the user can download a function of the share.
Comparing to the schemes in [17], [20], the scheme in the example is improved and generalized in the
following aspects. 1) The proposed scheme achieves the optimal bandwidth more flexibly. Specifically,
the schemes in [17], [20] achieve the optimal bandwidth for a single specific number of available parties.
The proposed scheme is more flexible as it can be designed to allow flexibility in the number of available
parties d. In the example of Figure 2b the scheme achieves the optimal bandwidth when d = 3, 4, 7.
In general, we can construct schemes that achieve the optimal bandwidth for all n − r ≤ d ≤ n. 2)
The proposed scheme is more flexible in rate. Specifically, the (perfect) schemes in [17], [20] have rate
exactly 1/n. The proposed scheme in the example has rate 2/7 > 1/n = 1/7. In general, we can construct
schemes of arbitrary rate.
We also remark on an interesting analog between communication efficient secret sharing and the well-
studied subject of regenerating codes [8], [16], [13]. Consider a regenerating code of length n that is able
to correct r > 1 erasures. If only one erasure occurs, then compared to repairing from a minimum set of
n − r nodes, repairing from all the n − 1 available nodes will significantly reduce the total amount of
communication that occurs during the repair. In this sense, for both regenerating codes and communication
efficient secret sharing, a key idea is to involve more available nodes/parties than the minimum required
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6set during repair/decoding, for the purpose of reducing the repair/decoding bandwidth.
B. Results
In Section III, we prove a tight information-theoretic lower bound on the decoding bandwidth, given
a set of available parties I ⊂ {1, ..., n}. The bound implies that the decoding bandwidth decreases as |I|
increases. The lower bound applies to both perfect and ramp schemes and generalizes the lower bound in
[17]. Particularly, we show that the overhead in communication for the case of |I| = n is only a fraction
(n− r − z)/(n− z) of the communication overhead when |I| = n− r.
In Section IV, we construct efficient secret sharing schemes using the ideas described in Section I-A.
Our construction utilizes Shamir’s scheme and achieves the optimal decoding bandwidth universally for all
I ∈ A. Additionally, the construction preserves the simplicity of Shamir’s scheme and is efficient in terms
of both space and computation. Specifically, the scheme achieves optimal space efficiency, and requires
the same field size as Shamir’s scheme. Encoding and decoding the scheme is also similar to encoding
and decoding Shamir’s scheme. The scheme shows that our lower bound in Section III is uniformly tight.
Interestingly, the scheme also generalizes the construction in a recent independent work [2]. However,
the flexibility of our framework allows improved efficiency in terms of computation, decoding delay and
partial decoding.
In Section V, we construct another secret sharing scheme from Reed-Solomon codes. The scheme
achieves the optimal decoding bandwidth when |I| = n and |I| = n−r. The decoder of the scheme has a
simpler structure compared to the decoder of the previous scheme, and therefore is advantageous in terms
of implementation. The scheme also offers a stronger level of reliability in that it allows decoding even
if more than r shares are partially lost. In Section VI we present a scheme from random linear codes that
achieves the optimal decoding bandwidth universally.
Finally, in the application of storage where each party is regarded as a disk, it is desirable to optimize
the efficiency of disk operations. Our lower bound on the decoding bandwidth is naturally a lower bound
on the number of symbol-reads from disks during decoding. In all of our schemes, the number of symbol-
reads during decoding equals to the amount of communication. Therefore, our schemes are also optimal in
terms of disk operations. In addition, by involving more than the minimum number of disks for decoding,
our schemes balance the load at the disks and achieve a higher degree of parallelization.
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7II. SECRET SHARING SCHEMES
Consider the problem of storing a secret message m securely and reliably into n shares, so that 1) m
can be recovered from any n − r shares, and 2) any z shares do not reveal any information about m,
i.e., they are statistically independent. Such a scheme is called a threshold secret sharing scheme, defined
formally as follows. Let Q be a general Q-ary alphabet, i.e., |Q| = Q. Denote by [n] = {1, ..., n}. For
any index set I ⊂ [n] and a vector c = (c1, ..., cn), denote by cI = (ci)i∈I .
Definition 1. An (n, k, r, z)Q secret sharing scheme consists of a randomized encoding function F that
maps a secret m ∈ Qk to c = (c1, ..., cn) = F (m) ∈ Qn, such that
1) (Reliability) The secret m can be decoded from any n− r shares (entries) of c. This guarantees that
m is recoverable in the loss of any r shares. Formally,
H(m|cI) = 0, ∀I ⊂ [n], |I| = n− r. (1)
Therefore for any I ⊂ [n], |I| = n− r, there exists a decoding function D∗I : Qn−r → Qk such that
D∗I (cI) =m.
2) (Secrecy) Any z shares of c do not reveal any information about m. This guarantees that m is
secure if any z shares are exposed to an eavesdropper. Formally,
H(m|cI) = H(m), ∀I ⊂ [n], |I| = z. (2)
Define the rate of a scheme to be k/n, which measures the space efficiency. The following proposition
gives an upper bound on the rate.
Proposition 1. For any (n, k, r, z)Q secret sharing scheme, it follows that
k ≤ n− r − z, (3)
and so the rate of the scheme is at most n−r−zn .
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8Proof: Let the message m be uniformly distributed, then
k = H(m) = H(m|c[z]) (4)
≤ H(m, c[n−r]|c[z])
= H(m|c[n−r], c[z]) +H(c[n−r]|c[z]) (5)
= H(c[n−r]|c[z]) (6)
= H(c{z+1,...,n−r}) ≤ n− r − z,
where (4) follows from the security requirement, (5) follows from the chain rule, and (6) follows from
the reliability requirement.
A secret sharing scheme is rate-optimal if it achieves equality in (3). Note that the scheme is a perfect
scheme if z = n − r − 1 and is a ramp scheme otherwise. Rate-optimal perfect secret sharing schemes
are studied in the seminal work by Shamir [14], and are later generalized to ramp schemes [4], [18].
Note that by (3) the rate of any perfect scheme is at most 1/n as k = 1. Any scheme of a higher rate is
necessarily a ramp scheme.
III. LOWER BOUND ON COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
Suppose that the n shares of the secret are stored by n parties or distributed storage nodes1, and a user
wants to decode the secret. By Definition 1, the user can connect to any n− r nodes and download one
share, i.e., one Q-ary symbol, from each node. Therefore, by communicating n − r symbols, the user
can decode a secret of k ≤ n − r − z symbols. It is clear that a communication overhead of z symbols
occurs during decoding. The question is, whether it is possible to reduce the communication overhead.
We answer this question affirmatively in the remaining part of the paper.
There are two key ideas for improving the communication overhead. Firstly, in many practical scenarios
and particularly in distributed storage systems, often time more than n−r nodes are available. In this case,
it is not necessary to restrict the user to download from only n− r nodes. Secondly, it is not necessary
to download the complete share stored by the node. Instead, it may suffice to communicate only a part
of the share or, in general, a function of the share. In other words, a node can preprocess its share before
transmitting it to the user.
1In what follows we do not distinguish between parties and nodes.
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9Motivated by these ideas, for any I ⊂ [n], |I| ≥ n − r, define a class of preprocessing functions
EI,i : Q → SI,i, where |SI,i| ≤ |Q|, that maps ci to eI,i = EI,i(ci). Let eI = (eI,i)i∈I , and define a
class of decoding functions DI :
∏
i∈I SI,i → Qk, such that DI(eI) =m. For a naive example, consider
any I such that |I| = n− r. Then for i ∈ I , we can let SI,i = Q, let EI,i be the identity function, and
let DI be the naive decoding function D∗I described in Definition 1. In the remaining paper, when I is
clear from the context, we will suppress it in the subscripts of SI,i, EI,i, eI,i and eI , and denote them
by Si, Ei, ei and e instead. We now formally define the notion of communication overhead in decoding.
Note that all log functions in the paper are base Q.
Definition 2. For any I such that |I| ≥ n − r, define the communication overhead function to be
CO(I) =
∑
i∈I log |SI,i| − k. Namely, CO(I) is the amount of extra information, measured in Q-ary
symbols, that one needs to communicate in order to decode a secret of k symbols, provided that the set
of available shares is indexed by I .
The following result provides a lower bound on the communication overhead function. It generalizes
the lower bound in [17] for perfect schemes, i.e., schemes with k = 1.
Theorem 1. For any (n, k, r, z)Q secret sharing scheme with preprocessing functions {EI,i}i∈[n],|I|≥n−r
and decoding functions {DI}|I|≥n−r, it follows that
CO(I) ≥ kz|I| − z . (7)
Proof: Consider arbitrary I = {i1, ..., i|I|} such that |I| ≥ n− r. Assume without loss of generality
that |Si1 | ≤ |Si2 | ≤ ... ≤ |Si|I| |. Recall that eI = (ei1 , ..., ei|I|) is the output of the preprocessing
functions.
H(ei1 , ..., ei|I|−z )
(a)
≥ H(ei1 , ..., ei|I|−z |ei|I|−z+1 , ..., ei|I|)
(b)
= H(ei1 , ..., ei|I|−z |ei|I|−z+1 , ..., ei|I|) +H(m|ei1 , ..., ei|I|)
(c)
= H(m, ei1 , ..., ei|I|−z |ei|I|−z+1 , ..., ei|I|)
≥ H(m|ei|I|−z+1 , ..., ei|I|)
(d)
= H(m) = k, (8)
where (a) follows from conditioning reduces entropy, (b) follows from (1), (c) follows form the chain
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rule, and (d) follows from (2). Therefore it follows from (8) that
|I|−z∏
j=1
|Sij | ≥ QH(ei1 ,...,ei|I|−z ) ≥ Qk,
and so
|I|−z∑
j=1
log |Sij | ≥ k. (9)
It then follows from |Si1 | ≤ ... ≤ |Si|I| | that,
log |Si|I|−z | ≥
k
|I| − z ,
and that,
log |Si|I|−z+j | ≥ log |Si|I|−z | ≥
k
|I| − z , j = 1, ..., z. (10)
Combining (9) and (10) we have,
CO(I) =
|I|∑
j=1
log |Sij | − k ≥
kz
|I| − z .
The decoding bandwidth is defined to be the total amount of Q-ary symbols the user downloads from the
nodes, which equals CO(I)+ k. Theorem 1 suggests that the communication overhead and the decoding
bandwidth decrease as the number of available nodes increases.
For rate-optimal schemes, Theorem 1 implies that if |I| = n − r, then the communication overhead
is at least z, i.e., the user needs to download the complete share from each available node. The naive
decoding function D∗I in Definition 1 trivially achieves this bound. The more interesting scenario is the
regime that |I| > n − r. In this case, if (7) is tight, then one can achieve a non-trivial improvement
on decoding bandwidth compared to the naive decoder D∗I . When k = 1 (i.e., for perfect schemes) and
fixing any d > n− r, [17] constructs a rate-optimal scheme that achieves the lower bound (7) for any I
such that |I| = d. However, several interesting and important questions remain open. Firstly, is the lower
bound uniformly tight, or in other words, is it possible to construct a scheme that achieves (7) universally
for any I such that |I| ≥ n − r (note that the scheme in [17] does not achieve the lower bound when
|I| 6= d)? Secondly, is the bound tight when k > 1 (i.e., for ramp schemes) and how to design such
schemes? We answer these questions in the following section.
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IV. CONSTRUCTION FROM SHAMIR’S SCHEME
In this section we construct a rate-optimal scheme that achieves the optimal decoding bandwidth
universally for all possible I , i.e., all sets of available nodes. This implies that the lower bound in
Theorem 1 is uniformly tight. The scheme is based on Shamir’s scheme and preserves its simplicity and
efficiency. The scheme is flexible in the parameters n, k, r, z and hence is flexible in rate.
We first refer the readers to Figure 2b for an example of the scheme, and use it to describe the general
idea of the construction. To construct a scheme that achieves the optimal decoding bandwidth when d
nodes are available, for all d ∈ D, we design a set of polynomials of different degrees. Particularly,
for all d ∈ D, we design a number of polynomials of degree exactly d − 1, and store one evaluation
of each polynomial at each node. For each polynomial, exactly z of its coefficients are independent
keys in order to meet the secrecy requirement. The remaining coefficients encode “information”: for the
highest-degree (e.g., degree dmax − 1, where dmax = maxd∈D d) polynomials, their coefficients encode
the entire message; for other polynomials, say g(x), the information encoded in the coefficients of g(x)
is the high-degree coefficients of the polynomials of degree higher than g(x). Such an arrangement of
the coefficients enables decoding in a successive manner. Consider decoding when d nodes are available,
implying that d evaluations of each polynomial are known and hence all polynomials of degree d − 1
can be interpolated. Then, roughly speaking, the arrangement ensures that the high-degree coefficients of
some higher-degree polynomials are known, so that the remaining unknown parts of these polynomials
can be interpolated. This in turn allows to decode coefficients for additional high-degree polynomials
and thus to interpolate them. The chain continues until all polynomials of degree higher than d − 1 are
interpolated, implying that the message is decoded. Note that no polynomials of degree smaller than d−1
are interpolated, and therefore the keys associated with them are not decoded. This leads to the saving
in decoding bandwidth and in fact this amount is the best one can expect to save, so that the scheme
achieves the optimal bandwidth. Below we describe the scheme formally.
A. Encoding
Consider arbitrary parameters n, r, z, D and let k = n − r − z. We assume that n − r ∈ D since it
is implied by the reliability requirement. Choose any prime power q > n, the scheme is Fq-linear over
share alphabet Q = Fbq , where b is the number of (Fq) symbols stored by each node. The message m is
a vector over Fq of length |m| = kb. The choice of b is determined by D in the following way. Let |m|
be the least common multiple of {d − z : d ∈ D}, i.e., the smallest positive integer that is divisible by
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all elements of the set. Note that indeed |m| is a multiple of k = n − r − z, and we let b = |m|k . This
is the smallest choice of |m| (and thus b) that ensures when d ∈ D nodes are available, that the optimal
bandwidth, measured by the number of Fq symbols, is an integer.
We now construct b polynomials over Fq , evaluate each of them at n non-zero points, and let every
node stores an evaluation of each polynomial. Let D = {d1, d2, ..., d|D|}, such that n ≥ d1 > d2 > ... >
d|D| = n− r. For i ∈ |D|, let
pi =

|m|
d1−z i = 1
|m|
di−z −
|m|
di−1−z i > 1
(11)
We construct pi polynomials of degree di − 1. For all polynomials, their z lowest-degree coefficients are
independent random keys. We next define the remaining di− z non-key coefficients. We first define them
for the highest degree polynomials, and then recursively define them for the lower degree polynomials.
For i = 1, the non-key coefficients of the polynomials of degree di − 1 are message symbols. Note
that there are |m| message symbols and |m|d1−z polynomials of degree d1 − 1. Each such polynomial has
d1 − z non-key coefficients and so there are exactly enough coefficients to encode the message symbols.
For i > 1, the non-key coefficients encode the degree di to di−1 − 1 coefficients of all higher (than
di− 1) degree polynomials. Note that there are
∑i−1
j=1 pj =
|m|
di−1−z higher degree polynomials and so the
total number of coefficients to encode is (di−1 − di) |m|di−1−z . On the other hand, there are pi polynomials
of degree di − 1, each of them has di − z non-key coefficients, and so the total number of non-key
coefficients is (di − z)
(
|m|
di−z −
|m|
di−1−z
)
. It is trivial to verify that the two numbers are equal and so
there is exactly enough coefficients to encode. Note that the specific way to map the coefficients is not
important and any 1-1 mapping suffices. Finally, evaluate each polynomial at n non-zero points and store
an evaluation of each polynomial at each node. This completes the scheme. Note that indeed the total
number of polynomials is
∑|D|
i=1 pi =
|m|
d|D|−z =
|m|
k = b, implying that the scheme is rate-optimal.
B. Decoding
For any di ∈ D, we describe the decoding algorithm of the scheme when di nodes are available. It
achieves the optimal decoding bandwidth, and since d|D| = n − r it implies that the scheme meets the
reliability requirement. We first interpolate all polynomials of degree di−1. After that for all polynomials
of degree di−1 − 1, their coefficients of degree larger than di − 1 are known (as they are encoded in the
coefficients of the polynomials of degree di − 1) and so they can be interpolated. In general, for j ≤ i,
once the polynomials of degree between dj − 1 and di − 1 are interpolated, then for the polynomials of
April 4, 2016 DRAFT
13
degree dj−1 − 1, their coefficients of degree larger than di − 1 are known by construction and so they
can be interpolated. Therefore we can successively interpolate the polynomials of higher degree until the
polynomials of degree d1−1 are interpolated and so the message symbols are decoded. The total number
of Fq symbols communicated is di
∑i
j=1 pj = di
|m|
di−z . By Theorem 1, the decoding bandwidth is at least
|m|+ kbz
di − z = kb+
kbz
di − z = kb
(
1 +
z
di − z
)
=
di|m|
di − z
Fq symbols. Therefore the optimal bandwidth is achieved.
C. Secrecy
We show that the scheme is secure against z eavesdropping nodes. Since each polynomial individually
is a Shamir’s scheme, the secrecy of the scheme derives from the secrecy of Shamir’s scheme. The main
idea is to show that if these polynomials are combined, the resulting scheme is still secure. We first prove
a simple lemma.
Lemma 1. Consider random variables M1, M2, K1, K2 such that K2 is independent of {M1,K1}.
For i = 1, 2 Let Fi be a deterministic function of Mi,Ki. If I(M1;F1) = 0 and I(M2;F2) = 0, then
I(M1;F1, F2) = 0. In addition, if K1 is independent of M2, then I(M1,M2;F1, F2) = 0.
Proof: We start with the first statement. Since F2 is a function of K2,M2 but K2 is independent
of {M1,K1, F1}, it follows that F2 is independent of {M1,K1, F1} conditioning on M2, implying
the Markov chain {M1,K1, F1} → M2 → F2. Therefore, I(M1,K1, F1,M2;F2) = I(M2;F2) = 0,
i.e., F2 and {M1,K1, F1,M2} are independent. Hence I(M1;F1, F2) = I(M1;F2) + I(M1;F1|F2) (a)=
I(M1;F1|F2) (b)= I(M1;F1) = 0, where (a) and (b) follows from the fact that F2 is independent from
{M1, F1}.
To prove the second statement, note that since K1 is independent of M2 and that F1 is a function
of M1,K1, we have the Markov Chain M2 → M1 → F1, by which it follows that I(M1,M2;F1) =
I(M1;F1) = 0. Similarly because K2 is independent of {M1,K1, F1} and that F2 is a function of M2,K2,
we have the Markov Chain {M1, F1} → M2 → F2. By this chain it follows that I(M1, F1,M2;F2) =
I(M2;F2) = 0, i.e., {M1, F1,M2} is independent of F2. Therefore I(M1,M2;F2|F1) = 0 and so
I(M1,M2;F1, F2) = I(M1,M2;F1) + I(M1,M2;F2|F1) = 0.
Suppose that the adversary compromises z nodes and obtains z evaluations of each polynomial. Consider
the i-th polynomial in the order that we define them, let fi denote the adversary’s observation of this
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polynomial, let ki denote the key coefficients of this polynomial and let mi denote the non-key coefficients.
The secrecy of Shamir’s scheme implies that
I(mi;fi) = 0, i = 1, ..., b. (12)
Consider the first p1 polynomials which are polynomials of the highest degree d1−1. By construction,
m1, ...,mp1 exactly encode the message m. We invoke Lemma 1 by regarding m1,k1, f1,m2,k2 and f2
as M1,K1, F1,M2,K2 and F2. By the second statement of the lemma it follows that I(m1,m2;f1,f2) =
0. Inductively, for 1 < i < p1, suppose that I(m1, ...,mi;f1, ...,fi) = 0. We regard {m1, ...,mi} as
M1, {k1, ...,ki} as K1, {f1, ...,fi} as F1, and regard mi+1,ki+1,fi+1 as M2,K2, F2. It follows from
Lemma 1 that I(m1, ...,mi+1;f1, ...,fi+1) = 0. By induction we have I(m1, ...,mp1 ;f1, ...,fp1) = 0.
We then regard {m1, ...,mp1} ,m as M1, {k1, ...,kp1} as K1, {f1, ...,fp1} as F1, and regard mp1+1,
kp1+1, fp1+1 as M2,K2, F2. Then it follows from the first statement of Lemma 1 that I(m;f1, ...,fp1+1) =
0. Inductively, for p1 < i < b, suppose that I(m;f1, ...,fi) = 0. We regard m as M1, {k1, ...,ki} as K1,
{f1, ...,fi} as F1, and regard mi+1,ki+1,fi+1 as M2,K2, F2. By Lemma 1 we have I(m;f1, ...,fi+1) =
0. By induction it follows that I(m;f1, ...,fb) = 0, implying that the adversary learns no information
about the message m. This completes the proof and we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let D ⊂ {n − r, n − r + 1, ..., n}, the encoding scheme constructed in Section IV-A is
a rate-optimal (n, k, r, z) secret sharing scheme. The scheme achieves the optimal decoding bandwidth
when d nodes participate in decoding, universally for all d ∈ D.
D. Discussion
We remark on some other important advantages and properties of our construction. Firstly, the scheme
also achieves the optimal number of symbol-reads from disks in decoding. To see this, notice that the
lower bound (7) on communication overhead is also a lower bound on the number of Q-ary symbols that
need to be read from disks during decoding. The number of symbol-reads in the proposed scheme equals
to the amount of communication. Therefore our scheme achieves the lower bound and hence is optimal.
Secondly, compared to most existing schemes which decode from the minimum number of n − r − z
nodes, our scheme allows all available nodes (or more flexibly, any d ∈ D nodes) to participate in
decoding and hence can help balance the load at the disks and achieves a higher degree of parallelization.
Thirdly, the encoding and decoding of the scheme are similar to that of Shamir’s scheme and therefore are
efficient and practical. Particularly, the scheme works over the same field as Shamir’s scheme. Fourthly,
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the preprocessing functions only rely on d = |I| instead of I , further simplifying implementation. Finally,
the construction is flexible in the parameters, i.e., it works for arbitrary values of n, r and z and D.
An important idea in our scheme is to construct polynomials of different degrees in order to facilitate
decoding when different number of nodes are available. Similar ideas also appear in the schemes in [17],
[20]. The main technique that enables the improvement of our schemes is a more careful and flexible
design of the numbers and degrees of the polynomials, as well as the arrangement of their coefficients.
Our scheme maps the high-degree coefficients of the higher degree polynomials into the coefficients
of the lower degree polynomials, whereas the specific mapping is not important and any 1-1 mapping
suffices. In practice, the flexibility in choosing the specific mapping is helpful. Particularly, it is possible
to improve the (computational) encoding complexity of the scheme substantially by choosing a mapping
that maintains the order of the coefficients. Refer to Figure 2b for an example. We need to compute
m4x+m5x
2 +m6x
3 in evaluating g(x), and we can reuse this computation in evaluating f(x), because
f(x) contains the same run of consecutive coefficients m4x4+m5x5+m6x6. This for example will save
2 multiplications and 2 additions.
We also note that for all polynomials in our scheme, the z lowest degree coefficients are independent
keys. However, in general this is not necessary: in any polynomial, we can choose any consecutive z
coefficients to be independent keys, and use the remaining coefficients to encode information (i.e., message
symbols and coefficients of higher degree polynomials). The resulting scheme is a still valid and achieves
the optimal decoding bandwidth universally. Under this observation, we note that our scheme generalizes
the scheme in a recent independent work [2]. Particularly, our scheme is equivalent to the scheme in [2]
if we require a specific coefficient mapping and let the z highest (instead of lowest) coefficients of all
polynomial to be keys2.
As noted above, the flexibility of our scheme in choosing the coefficient mapping is beneficial in
practice. Furthermore, we remark that choosing the lowest degree coefficients to be keys has several
practical advantages: decoding the scheme involves sequentially interpolating the polynomials through
multiple iterations, which can lead to undesirable delay especially when |D| is large. To mitigate this issue,
we wish to decode the message symbols “on the fly” in each iteration. Specifically, if d nodes are available,
then each time a polynomial is interpolated, exactly d new message and/or key symbols are decoded. Since
the number of symbols decoded in each interpolation, the total number of message symbols and the total
2The scheme in [2] also lets a node evaluate all polynomials at the same point, whereas this is not necessary in our framework.
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number of key symbols to be decoded are all fixed, there is a trade-off between the decoding order of the
key and message symbols. The optimal trade-off is to delay decoding the keys as much as possible, so that
the maximum number of message symbols are decoded on the fly. Specifically, notice that by the time that
a number of i polynomials are interpolated, at least zi key symbols are decoded since each polynomial
introduces z independent key coefficients for secrecy. The optimal trade-off is achieved if indeed exactly
zi keys are decoded, implying that (d − z)i message symbols are decoded. Our scheme achieves this
optimal trade-off by choosing the z lowest degree coefficients to be keys. This is because by construction,
only coefficients of degree higher than d|D| = n− r > z will be mapped to the coefficients of the lower
degree polynomials. Hence the key coefficients are never mapped, implying that the remaining information
coefficients encode only message symbols. Therefore, at any moment during the decoding process, our
scheme always decodes the maximum number of message symbols. In other words the decoding delay,
measured in the number of iterations, averaged over all message symbols, is minimized. Moreover, the
fact that each polynomial interpolation decodes a fixed number of d− z new message symbols is helpful
for implementation. On the other hand, note that choosing the z highest degree coefficients to be keys
implies that the keys will be mapped to the coefficients of lower degree polynomials. Hence the keys will
be decoded earlier than necessary (since lower degree polynomials are interpolated earlier) and it is not
possible to achieve the optimal trade-off. Consider the example in Figure 2b, if we switch the keys to high
degree coefficients, then the polynomials are f(x) = m1+m2x+m3x2+m4x3+m5x4+m6x5+k1x6,
g(x) = m5 + m6x + k1x
2 + k2x
3 and h(x) = m4 + k2x + k3x2. In the case that d = 4 nodes are
available, only 2 message symbols m5,m6 are decoded in the first iteration and the remaining 4 message
symbols are decoded in the second (last) iteration. In comparison, the original scheme performs better by
decoding 3 message symbols in each iteration. Finally, we remark that decoding the maximum number
of message symbols on the fly is also beneficial in terms of partial decoding, i.e., decoding a subset of
message symbols. In this case decoding can finish early if all symbols of interest are decoded, and our
scheme will maximize the chance of finishing early.
V. CONSTRUCTION FROM REED-SOLOMON CODES
In this section we present another rate-optimal secret sharing scheme that achieves the optimal decoding
bandwidth when all n nodes are available. The scheme is flexible in the parameters and hence is flexible
in rate. The scheme is directly related to Reed-Solomon codes. Particularly, the encoding matrix of the
scheme is a generator matrix of Reed-Solomon codes, and so the scheme can be decoded as Reed-Solomon
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codes. This is an advantage over the scheme in the previous section, which requires recursive decoding.
The scheme also provides a stronger level of reliability in the sense that it allows decoding even if more
than r shares are partially erased. On the other hand, unlike the previous scheme, this scheme does not
achieve the optimal decoding bandwidth universally, but rather only for d = n− r and d = n. However,
we remark that the case that the n nodes are available is particularly important because it correspond to
the best case in terms of decoding bandwidth and is arguably the most relevant case for the application
of distributed storage, where the storage nodes are usually highly available.
A. Encoding
Fix k = n−r−z, let q > n(k+r) be a prime power, and let the share alphabet be Q = Fk+rq . Note that
each share is a length k+r vector over Fq . For j = 1, ..., n, denote the j-th share by cj = (c1,j , ..., ck+r,j),
where ci,j ∈ Fq . The secret message m is k symbols over Q and therefore can be regarded as a length-
k(k+r) vector over Fq , denoted by (m1, ...,mk(k+r)). The encoder generates keys k = (k1, ..., kkz) ∈ Fkzq
and k′ = (k′1, ..., k
′
rz) ∈ Frzq independently and uniformly at random. The encoding scheme is linear over
Fq , and is described by an encoding matrix G over Fq:
(c1,1, ..., c1,n, ..., ck+r,1, ..., ck+r,n) = (m1, ...,mk(k+r), k1, ..., kkz, k
′
1, ..., k
′
rz)G. (13)
Note that G has k(k+r)+kz+rz = nk+rz rows and has n(k+r) columns. In the following we discuss
the construction of G based on a Vandermonde matrix. We start with some notation. Let α1, ..., αn(k+r)
be distinct non-zero elements of Fq , and let vij = αi−1j , i = 1, ..., nk + rz, j = 1, ..., n(k + r), then
V = (vij) is a Vandermonde matrix of the same size as G. Suppose f = (f0, ..., fi) is an arbitrary vector
with entries in Fq , we denote by f [x] the polynomial f0 + f1x + ... + fixi over Fq with indeterminate
x. We construct a set of polynomials as follows:
fi[x] = x
i−1 i = 1, ..., kn, (14)
fkn+i[x] = x
i−1
kn∏
j=1
(x− αj) i = 1, ..., rz. (15)
Let fi, i = 1, ..., kn+rz be the length-(kn+rz) vectors over Fq corresponding to the polynomials. Stack
the fi’s to obtain a sqaure matrix of size (kn+ rz):
T =

f1
...
fkn+rz

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Finally, we complete the construction by setting
G = TV.
Example 1. Consider the setting that n = 3, r = 1, z = 1 and k = n−r−z = 1. Let q = 7 and Q = F2q .
Then m = (m1,m2), k = (k1) and k′ = (k′1). Construct a Vandermonde matrix over Fq as
V =

1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 4 2 2 4 1
1 1 6 1 6 6
 . (16)
Construct polynomials f1[x] = 1, f2[x] = x, f3[x] = x2 and
f4[x] = (x− 1)(x− 2)(x− 3) = 1 + 4x+ x2 + x3.
Therefore,
T =

f1
f2
f3
f4
 =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
1 4 1 1
 ,
and the encoding matrix is given by
G = TV =

1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 4 2 2 4 1
0 0 0 6 3 4
 .
The properties of G are discussed in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Regard G as a block matrix
G =
 G11 G12
G21 G22
 ,
where G11 has size kn × kn, G12 has size kn × rn, G21 has size rz × kn, and G22 has size rz × rn.
Then,
(i) Any (n− r)(k + r) columns of G are linearly independent.
(ii) G11 is a Vandermonde matrix.
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(iii) G21 = 0.
(iv) Any rz columns of G22 are linearly independent.
Proof: By construction, the polynomials fi[x], i = 1, ..., kn+ rz have distinct degrees and therefore
are linearly independent. Therefore the rows of T are linearly independent and so T is full rank. This
implies that the row space of G is the same as the row space of V . The row space of V is a linear
(nk+nr, nk+rz) MDS code3 because that V is a Vandermonde matrix. Note that nk+rz = (n−r)(k+r),
and so the row space of G is a linear (nk + nr, (n− r)(k + r)) MDS code. This proves (i).
To prove (ii), note that by (14), the first kn rows of G are exactly the first kn rows of V . Therefore
G11 is a Vandermonde matrix.
To prove (iii), note that by construction the (i, j)-th entry of G21 equals fkn+i[αj ]. By (15), αj is a
root of fkn+i[x], for i = 1, ..., rz, j = 1, ..., kn. Hence G21 = 0.
Finally we prove (iv). By construction the (i, j)-th entry of G22 equals
fkn+i[αkn+j ] = α
i−1
kn+j
kn∏
l=1
(αkn+j − αl) = αi−1kn+jf∗[αkn+j ], (17)
where f∗[x] =
∏kn
l=1(x−αl). Since α1, ..., α(k+r)n are distinct elements, it follows that f∗[αkn+j ] 6= 0,
for j = 1, ..., rn. Let 1 ≤ j1 < j2 < ... < jrz ≤ rn and consider the submatrix formed by the j1-th,...,jrz-
th columns of G22. By (17), the l-th column of the submatrix are formed by consecutive powers of αkn+jl ,
scaled by f∗[αkn+jl ]. Therefore the determinant of the submatrix is
∏rz
l=1 f
∗[αkn+jl ]
∏
1≤u<v≤rz(αkn+jv−
αkn+ju) 6= 0. This shows that any rz columns of G22 are linearly independent.
B. Decoding
We describe the decoding procedure for two cases: 1) |I| = n, i.e., all nodes are available, and 2)
|I| < n. First consider the case that |I| = n, i.e., I = [n]. In order to decode, for this case it suffices
to read and communicate the first k symbols over Fq from each share. Formally, the user downloads
e = (c1,1, ..., c1,n, ..., ck,1, ..., ck,n). By Lemma 2.(ii), G11 is invertible. Denote the inverse of G11 by
G−111 , then the secret can be recovered by
eG−111
(e)
= (m1, ...,mk(k+r), k1, ..., kkz),
3In fact this is the Reed-Solomon code.
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where (e) follows from (13) and Lemma 2.(iii). The decoding process involves communicating kn symbols
from Fq . The communication overhead is kz symbols over Fq or kzk+r =
kz
n−z Q-ary symbols, which
achieves the lower bound (7) and therefore is optimal.
Next consider the case that n − r ≤ |I| < n. Select an arbitrary subset I ′ of I of size n − r, and
download the complete share stored by the nodes in I ′. Hence, the downloaded information e is a length-
(n − r)(k + r) vector over Fq . By Lemma 2.(i), it follows that any (n − r)(k + r) columns in G are
linearly independent and therefore the submatrix formed by these columns is invertible. The secret m can
then be recovered by multiplying e with the inverse. An alternative way to decode the secret is to notice
that G is an encoding matrix of a (nk + nr, nk + rz) Reed-Solomon code over Fq . Therefore one may
employ the standard decoder of Reed-Solomon code to correct any r(k+r) erasures or br(k+r)/2c errors
of symbols over Fq . Note that when at most r nodes are unavailable , we regard their shares as erased
and there are at most r(k + r) erasures of symbols over Fq , and therefore can be corrected. In general,
any r(k + r) erasures or br(k + r)/2c errors are correctable even if they occur to more than r nodes.
The decoding process involves communicating nk + rz symbols of Fq . The communication overhead is
(n− r)(k + r)− k(k + r) = z(k + r) symbols over Fq , or z symbols over Q, which achieves the lower
bound (7) if and only if |I| = n− r.
C. Analysis
Theorem 3. The encoding scheme constructed in Section V-A is a rate-optimal (n, k, r, z) secret sharing
scheme. The scheme achieves the optimal decoding bandwidth when d nodes participate in decoding, for
d = n or d = n− r.
Proof: We need to verify that the encoding scheme meets the reliability requirement and the security
requirement of a secret sharing scheme, formally defined in Definition 1. Explicit decoding scheme and its
communication overhead are discussed in Section V-B and therefore the reliability requirement is met. The
scheme is rate-optimal because k = n− r− z. We only need to show that the encoding scheme is secure.
To this end, we first show that H(k,k′|cI ,m) = 0, for all I such that |I| = z. In other words, the random
symbols generated by the encoder are completely determined by cI and the secret. Denote the submatrix
formed by the first k(k+ r) rows of G by Gtop and the submatrix formed by the remaining (k+ r)z rows
of G by Glow. Consider any I = {i1, ..., iz}, and let cI = (c1,i1 , ..., c1,iz , ..., ck+r,i1 , ..., ck+r,iz ). It then
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follows from (13) that
cI = (m1, ...,mk(r+k))Gtop,I + (k1, ..., kkz, k
′
1, ..., k
′
rz)Glow,I ,
where Gtop,I is the submatrix formed by the subset of columns in {i+ j|i ∈ I, j = 0, n, ..., (k+ r− 1)n}
of Gtop, and Glow,I is the submatrix formed by the same subset of columns of Glow. Therefore, written
concisely,
(k k′)Glow,I = cI −mGtop,I . (18)
To study the rank of Glow,I , note that it is a square matrix of size (k + r)z, and we regard it as a block
matrix
Glow,I =
 G′11 G′12
G′21 G
′
22
 , (19)
where G′11 has size kz × kz, G′12 has size kz × rz, G′21 has size rz × kz and G′22 has size rz × rz.
By Lemma 2.(ii), G′11 is a block of a Vandermonde matrix and therefore is invertible. By Lemma 2.(iii),
G′21 = 0. Denote cI −mGtop,I by (u1, ..., u(k+r)z), then the above two facts together with (18) imply
that
k = (u1, ..., ukz)G
′−1
11 (20)
Therefore k is a deterministic function of m and cI . It follows from (18) that
k′G′22 = (ukz+1, ..., u(k+r)z)− kG′12.
By Lemma 2.(iv), G′22 is invertible and therefore
k′ =
(
(ukz+1, ..., u(k+r)z)− kG′12
)
G′−122 . (21)
This shows that k′ is a deterministic function of k, cI and m, and so
H(k,k′|cI ,m) = 0. (22)
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It then follows that,
H(m)−H(m|cI) = I(m; cI)
= H(cI)−H(cI |m)
(f)
≤ z −H(cI |m)
(g)
= z −H(cI |m) +H(cI |m,k,k′)
= z − I(cI ;k,k′|m)
= z −H(k,k′|m) +H(k,k′|cI ,m)
(h)
= z −H(k,k′|m)
(i)
= z −H(k,k′)
(j)
= z − z = 0, (23)
where (f) is due to |I| = z; (g) is due to the fact that cI is a function of m, k and k′; (h) is due to
(22); (i) is due to the fact that k,k′ are independent of m; and (j) follows from the fact that k,k′ are
uniformly distributed. Therefore H(m) = H(m|cI) and the security requirement is met. This completes
the proof that the encoding scheme is a valid secret sharing scheme.
Theorem 3 shows that the proposed secret sharing scheme is optimal in terms of storage usage and
is optimal in terms of best-case (i.e., |I| = n) communication overhead. Compared to the scheme in the
previous section, this scheme has advantages in terms of implementation and error correction because
decoding the scheme is equivalent to decoding standard Reed-Solomon codes. The scheme also provides
a stronger level of reliability in the sense that it allows decoding even if more than r shares are partially
erased. Similar to previous discussion, the scheme achieves the optimal number of symbol-reads from disks
when |I| = n. Finally, in the scheme all operations are performed over the field Fq , where q > n(k+ r).
This requirement on the field size can be relaxed in the following simple way. Let β be the greatest common
divisor of k and r, then instead of choosing Q to be Fk+rq , we can let Q = F
k
β+
r
β
q , m = (m1, ...,m k(k+r)
β
),
k = (k1, ..., k kz
β
) and k′ = (k′1, ..., k
′
rz
β
). The resulting scheme is a rate-optimal (n, k, r, z)Q secret
sharing scheme with the same communication overhead function as the original scheme. For this modified
construction, it is sufficient to choose any field size q > nk+rβ .
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VI. SECRET SHARING SCHEMES FROM RANDOM CODES
In this section we describe a rate-optimal (perfect or ramp) secret sharing scheme based on random
linear codes that achieves the optimal decoding bandwidth universally. The scheme meets the secrecy
requirement deterministically, and meets the reliability requirement with high probability as the field size
grows.
A. Encoding
Let k = n− r − z, q be a prime power, and let N be the least common multiple of {n− z − r, , n−
z − r + 1, ..., n− z}. Set Q = FN(k+r)q . Therefore each share of the secret is a length N(k + r) vector
over Fq . For j = 1, ..., n, denote the j-th share by cj = (c1,j , ..., cN(k+r),j), where ci,j ∈ Fq . The secret
m consists of k symbols over Q and is regarded as a length-Nk(k + r) vector over Fq , denoted by
(m1, ...,mNk(k+r)). The encoder generates uniformly distributed random vectors k = (k1, ..., kNkz) ∈
FNkzq and k′ = (k′1, ..., k′Nrz) ∈ FNrzq , independently from m. The encoding scheme is described by a
set of N(kn+ rz)× n encoding matrices Gi, i = 1, ..., N(k + r) over Fq , such that
(ci,1, ..., ci,n) = (m k k
′)Gi, i = 1, ..., N(k + r). (24)
Intuitively, if the cu,v’s are arranged into a matrix, then Gi is the encoding matrix for the i-th row. We
next describe the construction of the Gi matrices. For i = 1, ..., Nk, let the first Nk(k + r) rows of Gi
be a random matrix, let the next Nkz rows of Gi be a Vandermonde matrix, and let the remaining Nrz
rows of Gi be zero. Formally, for i = 1, ..., Nk,
Gi =

Ri
Vi
0
 , (25)
where Ri ∈ FNk(k+r)×nq is a random matrix with entries i.i.d. uniformly distributed over Fq , and Vi ∈
FNkz×nq is a Vandermonde matrix, i.e., the (u, v)-th entry of Vi equals α
u−1
v,i . Here αv,i are distinct
non-zero elements of Fq , for i = 1, ..., N(k + r), and v = 1, ..., n.
For i = 1, ..., Nr, let the first Nkn+ (i− 1)z rows of GNk+i be a random matrix, let the next z rows
of GNk+i be a Vandermonde matrix, and let the remaining (Nr− i)z rows of GNk+i be zero. Formally,
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for i = 1, ..., Nr,
GNk+i =

RNk+i
VNk+i
0
 , (26)
where RNk+i ∈ F(Nkn+(i−1)z)×nq is a random matrix with entries i.i.d. uniformly distributed over Fq , and
VNk+i ∈ Fz×nq is a Vandermonde matrix, i.e., the (u, v)-th entry of VNk+i equals αu−1v,Nk+i. This completes
the encoding scheme. The structure of the whole encoding matrix (G1, ..., GN(k+r)) is illustrated in Figure
3.
Fig. 3: Blockwise structure of the matrix (G1, ..., GN(k+r)). Blocks of random matrices are labelled by
R, blocks of Vandermonde matrices are labelled by V, and blocks of zero matrices are labelled by 0.
The following result shows that the scheme meets the security requirement deterministically, due to the
Vandermonde matrices embedded in the Gi’s.
Theorem 4. The encoding scheme constructed in this section is secure, i.e., H(m|cI) = H(m), for all
I such that |I| = z.
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Proof: Consider any I such that |I| = z. As in Theorem 3, we first show that H(k,k′|cI ,m) = 0.
Denote by Gi,I , Ri,I and Vi,I the submatrix formed by the set of columns in I of Gi, Ri and Vi,
respectively. Let
G1→Nk,I = (G1,I ... GNk,I)
R1→Nk,I = (R1,I ... RNk,I)
V1→Nk,I = (V1,I ... VNk,I).
Denote for short ci = (ci,j)j∈I , then by (24), it follows that
(m k k′)G1→Nk,I = (m k k′)

R1→Nk,I
V1→Nk,I
0

= (c1, ..., cNk).
Notice that V1→Nk,I is a Nkz ×Nkz square Vandermonde matrix. Therefore it is invertible and
k = ((c1, ..., cNk)−mR1→Nk,I)V −11→Nk,I .
Hence H(k|cI ,m) = 0. Then by (24), it follows that
(m k | k′1, ..., k′z| k′z+1, ..., k′Nrz)

RNk+1,I
VNk+1,I
0
 = cNk+1.
Notice that VNk+1,I is a z × z square Vandermonde matrix. Therefore it is invertible and
(k′1, ..., k
′
z) = (cNk+1 − (m k)RNk+1,I)V −1Nk+1,I .
Hence H(k′1, ..., k
′
z|k, cI ,m) = 0. Similarly, we can show that for i = 1, ..., Nr
H(k′(i−1)z+1, ..., k
′
iz|k′1, ..., k′(i−1)z,k, cI ,m) = 0.
Therefore by the chain rule,
H(k,k′|cI ,m) = H(k|cI ,m) +
Nr∑
i=1
H(k′(i−1)z+1, ..., k
′
iz|k′1, ..., k′(i−1)z,k, cI ,m)
= 0. (27)
Provided that (27) is true, we can then follow exactly the same argument as (23) in the proof of Theorem
3, to show that H(m|cI) = H(m). This completes the proof.
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B. Decoding
We describe the decoding scheme for any I such that |I| ≥ n− r. Let
d , Nk(n− |I|)|I| − z , (28)
then note that d is an integer because |I| − z divides N and that d is the solution to the equation
(Nk + d)|I| = Nkn + dz. In order to decode, it suffices to read and communicate the first Nk + d
symbols over Fq from each available share. Intuitively, by reading the first Nk + d symbols from each
available share, we have a system of (Nk + d)|I| equations. On the other hand, the variables involved
in these equations are m1, ...,mNk(k+r), k1, ..., kNkz and k′1, ..., k
′
dz , i.e., the total number of variables is
Nkn+ dz. Because d is the solution to (Nk+ d)|I| = Nkn+ dz, the number of equations in the system
equals the number of variables, and is uniquely solvable if the equations are linearly independent.
Formally, let Si = FNk+dq , and let Ei(ci) = (c1,i, ..., cNk+d,i). Denote for short that ci = (ci,j)j∈I , and
denote the submatrix formed by the set of columns in I of Gi by Gi,I . Then it follows from (24) that,
eI = (c1, ..., cNk+d) = (m k k
′)(G1,I , ..., GNk+d,I).
By construction (25) and (26), the last (Nr − d)z rows of the matrices G1,I , ..., GNk+d,I are all zeros.
Therefore we may delete the last (Nr−d)z rows from G1,I , ..., GNk+d,I and denote by (G∗1,I , ..., G∗Nk+d,I)
the corresponding trimmed matrix. It then follows that,
eI = (c1, ..., cNk+d) = (m k k
′
1, ..., k
′
dz)(G
∗
1,I , ..., G
∗
Nk+d,I).
It is now evident that if the matrix (G∗1,I , ..., G
∗
Nk+d,I) has full row rank, then it is right invertible and
the secret can be recovered. The following result shows that the matrix indeed has full row rank with
high probability.
Theorem 5. For any I such that |I| ≥ n− r, (G∗1,I , ..., G∗Nk+d,I) has full row rank with probability at
least 1− 1q−1 , over the distribution of the random matrices R1, ..., RNk+d.
Proof: Note that (G∗1,I , ..., G
∗
Nk+d,I) has size (Nkn + dz) × (Nk + d)|I|. By the definition of d,
it follows that Nkn + dz = (Nk + d)|I| and therefore the matrix is square. Hence it suffices to show
the matrix has full column rank and in the following we show the columns of the matrix are linearly
independent with high probability.
The first Nkz columns of (G∗1,I , ..., G
∗
Nk,I) are linearly independent because by (25), the (Nkn−Nkz+
1)-th row to the Nkn-th row form a Vandermonde matrix. Denote the i-th column of (G∗1,I , ..., G
∗
Nk+d,I)
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by gi. We first study the probability that the gNkz+i is in the linear span of all the previous columns, i.e.,
span[g1, ..., gNkz+i−1], for i = 1, ..., Nk(|I| − z). Consider the sum of vectors g∗ =
∑NKz+i−1
l=1 γlgl.
Fixing γ1, ..., γi−1 to be arbitrary values in Fq , then there is a unique tuple (γl)NKz+i−1l=i such that g∗
agrees with gNKz+i in the (Nkn − Nkz + 1)-th to Nkn-th entries. Therefore there are qi−1 different
ways to linearly combine g1, ..., gNkz+i−1, such that in the resulting sum vector, the (Nkn−Nkz+1)-th
to Nkn-th entries are equal to the corresponding entries of gNkz+i. Because the first Nk(n− z) entries
of gNkz+i are i.i.d. uniformly distributed, it follows that
Pr{gNkz+i ∈ span[g1, ..., gNkz+i−1]} ≤ q
i−1
qNk(n−z)
, i = 1, ..., Nk(|I| − z) (29)
We next study the probability that gNk|I|+i is in span[g1, ..., gNk|I|+i−1]. Consider arbitrary Nk ≤
j ≤ Nk + d − 1. By construction (26), gj|I|+i /∈ span[g1, ..., gj|I|+i−1], for 1 ≤ i ≤ z, due to the
Vandermonde matrix VNk+j . Now consider gj|I|+i with z + 1 ≤ i ≤ |I|. There are qj|I|+i−z−1 different
ways to linearly combine g1, ..., gj|I|+i−1, such that in the resulting sum vector, the (Nkn+(j−Nk)z+1)-
th to (Nkn+(j−Nk)z+z)-th entries are equal to the corresponding entries in gj|I|+i. Note that the first
Nkn+(j−Nk)z entries of gj|I|+i are i.i.d. uniformly distributed. Therefore, for Nk ≤ j ≤ Nk+d− 1
and z + 1 ≤ i ≤ |I|, it follows that
Pr{gj|I|+i ∈ span[g1, ..., gj|I|+i−1]} ≤ q
j|I|+i−z−1
qNkn+(j−Nk)z
. (30)
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Hence, by the union bound
Pr{(G∗1,I , ..., G∗Nk+d,I) singular}
≤
Nk(|I|−z)∑
i=1
Pr{gNkz+i l.d.2}+
Nk+d−1∑
j=Nk
|I|∑
i=z+1
Pr{gj|I|+i l.d.}
(k)
≤
Nk(|I|−z)∑
i=1
qi−1
qNk(n−z)
+
Nk+d−1∑
j=Nk
|I|∑
i=z+1
qj|I|+i−z−1
qNkn+(j−Nk)z
=
Nk(|I|−n)−1∑
i=Nk(z−n)
qi +
Nk+d−1∑
j=Nk
|I|∑
i=z+1
qj|I|+i−z−1
qNkn+(j−Nk)z
=
Nk(|I|−n)−1∑
i=Nk(z−n)
qi +
Nk+d−1∑
j=Nk
|I|−z−1∑
i=0
qj(|I|−z)+i+Nk(z−n)
=
Nk(|I|−n)−1∑
i=Nk(z−n)
qi + qNk(z−n)
Nk+d−1∑
j=Nk
|I|−z−1∑
i=0
qj(|I|−z)+i
=
Nk(|I|−n)−1∑
i=Nk(z−n)
qi + qNk(z−n)
(Nk+d)(|I|−z)−1∑
i=Nk(|I|−z)
qi
=
Nk(|I|−n)−1∑
i=Nk(z−n)
qi +
(Nk+d)|I|−Nkn−dz−1∑
i=Nk(|I|−n)
qi
(l)
=
Nk(|I|−n)−1∑
i=Nk(z−n)
qi +
−1∑
i=Nk(|I|−n)
qi
<
−1∑
i=−∞
qi =
1
q − 1 , (31)
where (k) is due to (29) and (30), and (l) is due to (28). This completes the proof.
The following result summarizes the properties of scheme.
Corollary 1. The encoding scheme constructed in Section VI-A is a rate-optimal (n, k, r, z) secret sharing
scheme with high probability. Specifically, the scheme meets the security requirement deterministically,
and meets the reliability requirement with probability at least 1− 2nq−1 , over the distribution of the random
matrices R1, ..., RNk+d. The scheme achieves the optimal decoding bandwidth when d nodes participate
in decoding, universally for all n− r ≤ d ≤ n.
4Linearly dependent on the set of columns to the left.
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Proof: The scheme achieves capacity because k = n− r − z. By Theorem 4, the scheme meets the
security requirement. By Theorem 5 and the union bound, the scheme meets the reliability requirement
with probability at least 1−∑ri=0 (ni) 1q−1 ≥ 1− 2nq−1 .
Consider any I such that |I| ≥ n− r. In order to decode, a number of (Nk + d)|I| symbols over Fq
are communicated. Therefore the communication overhead is
CO(I) =
(Nk + d)|I| −Nk(k + r)
N(k + r)
=
Nkn+ dz −Nk(k + r)
N(k + r)
=
Nkz + dz
N(k + r)
=
z(Nk + Nk(n−|I|)|I|−z )
N(k + r)
=
Nk(n− z)z
(|I| − z)N(k + r) =
kz
|I| − z ,
which achieves equality in (7).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we study the communication efficiency of secret sharing schemes in decoding. We
prove an information-theoretic lower bound on the amount of information to be communicated during
decoding, and show that the decoding bandwidth decreases as d, the number of nodes that participate in
decoding, increases. We prove that the bound is uniformly tight by designing a secret sharing scheme
that achieves the optimal decoding bandwidth universally for all valid d. The scheme is simple and is
efficient in both space and computation. We construct another secret sharing scheme that achieves the
optimal decoding bandwidth when all nodes are available. The scheme has an advantage in implementation
because its codewords form the Reed-Solomon codes. In the application of distributed storage, the proposed
communication efficient secret sharing schemes also improve disk access efficiency. There are a number
of interesting open problems: 1) in the application of distributed storage, how can one construct codes
that are communication efficient in terms of both decoding and repair? 2) how to generalize the results
to other (non-threshold) access structures? and 3) is it possible to extend the schemes and ideas in the
paper to improve the communication efficiency of other secure protocols that use secret sharing schemes
as building blocks?
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